Introduction
Latin American nations persistently rank among the most unequal in the world in terms of distribution of earnings and wealth. Discussion of this problem has produced agreement on some of its causes: the Region's disappointing distributive performance has been due to pervasive levels of macroeconomic vulnerability, inequality in political voice and problems of social exclusion that are rooted in history (World Bank, 2004; IDB, 2007) . However, the notion of mobility has not yet taken a central place in this discussion. That mobility has not played a role in the discussion of inequality for the Region reflects a lack of both appropriate data and methodological tools. In the literature in the developed world, the traditional framework for analyzing mobility demands data requirements that Latin America has not been able to fully supply yet, namely panel data. Only recently have pseudo-panel methods begun to be developed to, at least partially, overcome this data limitation. This paper is an attempt to apply these new methodological developments to a broad set of data from Latin America and in this way collaborate in putting this discussion on the empirical research agenda of inequality in the Region.
The role of mobility in the analysis of inequality has already been emphasized in the economic literature (see Fields, 2005, and Galiani, 2006 , for recent reviews). Static measures of inequality, however, are insufficient to portray the well-being of individuals in a society and must be complemented by the dynamics of mobility. The welfare of individuals in two societies with similar levels of income inequality but different patterns of income mobility would be expected to differ. Individuals in the society with higher mobility would enjoy greater incentives to exert effort and climb up the income distribution than individuals in the society with lower mobility. The aggregation of these individual incentives would in turn be translated into higher productivity in the overall economy, with subsequent beneficial outcomes.
Macroeconomic vulnerability, coupled with the lack of an effective social protection network in the Region, imposes a considerable risk for individuals to slip into poverty (as reported, for instance, in Argentina by Corbacho, García-Escribano and Incahuste, 2003) . This form of individual vulnerability is associated with downward absolute mobility along the welfare distribution. Fields et al. (2005) have found that, in upper segments of the income distribution, there is no conclusive evidence that individuals either realize large gains during booms or experience large losses during recessions. That is to say that downward mobility might therefore 3 not take place equally across the whole income distribution or, if it does, it happens at different rates.
Exclusion implies an inherent difficulty for individuals who want to move out of dire conditions by neglecting them access to services, consumption goods and assets. Societies with a higher incidence of exclusion should then report lower upward mobility than societies with more equal opportunities (as reported for Chile by Scott, 2000) . Along similar lines, high and persistent inequality is consistent with lower mobility, although the causal relationship still requires an empirical investigation.
The analysis of mobility and the mechanisms through which it operates constitute important tools for policymaking. When governments know the details about the most effective ways of moving people up or preventing them from falling down the income ladder, the design of policies becomes more effective. Also, when governments better understand the tools to cope with downward mobility, the welfare losses associated can be at least ameliorated. That is, an understanding of the factors behind mobility becomes a must. This paper is a contribution to the limited literature on regional income mobility. There are several reasons for choosing a regional focus, but the most important one, from a policymaking stance, is that it allows for country-specific effects to be compared with subregional and Region-wide effects. Of course, the analysis of regional mobility has shortcomings of its own, such as the need to exclude countries and periods from the analysis due to data limitations, as explained below. After this introduction, Section 2 defines mobility along the lines of the categorization in Fields (2005) and discusses the methodology used to estimate absolute income mobility, conditional mobility (after controlling for personal, socioeconomic and geographical features of households), country-specific income mobility and poverty mobility (defined as slipping into or moving out of a poverty threshold). Section 3 describes the construction of a pseudo-panel composed of 14 Latin American countries for the period 1992-2003. The section also describes income and poverty trends for the constructed cohorts, which are innovatively constructed as biannual averages. This strategy ensures a pseudo-panel balance and avoids estimation caveats faced by unbalanced panels. Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 provides concluding remarks. 4
The Estimation of Mobility
The measurement of income mobility, which started with Lillard and Willis (1978) , basically involves the establishment of a relationship between past and present income: µ is a disturbance term and the parameter β , the coefficient of the slope in a regression of the income over its lagged value, is the measure of mobility. Fields (2005) 1 refers to this as time-dependence mobility and it will be the focus of our paper. A value of β equal to 1 represents a situation with no income convergence; a value of β below 1 corresponds to a situation in which there is convergence, while zero represents an extreme case in which mobility would be total (as there would be no relationship between past and present incomes). Although there are no ex-ante restrictions on the range of values that β should take, they are regularly within the [0,1] interval. Additionally, the mobility estimator obtained from (1) is called unconditional in the sense that it does not take into account the presence of covariates (other than past income) that may explain present income.
When the estimation is performed with additional controls, we have the time-dependence conditional estimation of mobility:
where X is a vector of covariates and δ is intended to measure the impact of those covariates on income. Given that this sort of analysis attempts to follow individuals (or households) over time, the quintessential data tool has been panel data. Unfortunately, such data have only recently become available in Latin America, and the few data panels presently in existence cover only short periods.
2 This has constituted an important barrier to the analysis of mobility in the Region.
The development of pseudo-panel techniques that was initiated by Deaton (1985) has been an 1 Fields (2005) also summarizes other definitions of mobility: positional movement (a measure of individual's changes in economic positions); share movement (a measure of changes in individual's shares of incomes); income flux (size of the fluctuations in individual's incomes but not their sign); directional income movement (how many people move up or down and by how many dollars); mobility as an equalizer of longer-term incomes (a comparison of the inequality of income at one point in time with the inequality of income over a longer period). Timedependence mobility is the definition most vastly used.
5 interesting alternative to overcome this data limitation. A pseudo-panel is formed creating synthetic observations obtained from averaging real observations with similar characteristics (regularly, birth year) in a sequence of repeated cross sectional data sets. In this way, the synthetic units of observations can be thought as being "followed" over time. The model then requires an appropriate modification:
where the individual index, i, has been replaced by a cohort index, c (t) , that is time-dependent.
Analogously to equation (1), the slope c β is the parameter of interest. The literature has then focused on exploring the conditions under which such a parameter can be consistently estimated, provided the data limitations imposed by a set of repeated cross-sections (instead of real panel data). The works of Browning, Deaton and Irish (1985) , Moffit (1993) , Collado (1997 ), Girma (2000 , McKenzie (2004) , Verbeek and Vella (2002) and Antman and McKenzie (2005) , among others, have provided such sets of conditions that the interested reader can explore.
Not surprisingly, there are pros and cons about the use of pseudo-panels for the analysis of mobility. At least three arguments may be cited in its favor. The first is that they suffer less from problems related to sample attrition (because the samples are renewed at every period). The second is that, being constructed by averaging groups of individual observations, they also suffer less from problems related to measurement error (at least at the individual level). A third argument in favor of the use of pseudo-panels, a more practical one, is that because of the wide availability of cross-sectional data it is possible to construct pseudo-panels that are appropriately representative, covering long periods back in time, substantially more than what can be covered by real panels. The main argument against its use has to do with the fact that the decision about the clustering of observations in cohorts depends on a trade-off (number of cohorts vs. number of observations in each cohort) on which the literature has not yet been conclusive. The larger the number of cohorts, the smaller is the number of individuals per cohort. On the one hand, one would like to have a large number of cohorts so that the regressions performed with the resulting pseudo-panels suffer less from small sample problems. On the other hand, however, if the number of observations per cohort were not large enough, the average characteristics per cohort 6 would fail to be good estimates for the population cohort means. In addition, Antman and McKenzie (2005) note two caveats from the use of pseudo-panels. They may introduce biases if the average cohort household fails to account for changing trends in household dissolution and creation (such as,for instance, migration). Also, intra-cohort mobility is utterly ignored. In this vein, Girma (2000) indicates that intra-cohort homogeneity in pseudo-panels (consistent with the notion of "representative" agents) is too strong an assumption.
3 In any case, Bourgignon, Goh little mobility between the earnings of rich and poor households but rapid convergence in the average household's earnings, suggesting higher levels of conditional mobility. 3 Girma's proposed method, a pair-wise quasi-differencing approach, allows for estimated parameters to vary freely across groups and allows for the presence of unobserved individual specific heterogeneity within each cohort. However, it imposes an equicorrelation structure within a group-time cell. In other words, it also imposes some degree of homogeneity within groups. 4 Also, the study of mobility using real panels has been undertaken in Fields et al. (2006) for Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela; and Albornoz and Menendez (2004) for Argentina.
Other studies have explored income (earnings) mobility in the context of pro-poor growth, typically using panel data. Gottschalk (1997) , Fields and Ok (1999) , Ravallion and Chen (2003) , Grim (2007) , among others, explore whether economic growth has favoured the poor in the United States, the United Kingdom and other OECD countries, as well as China, Peru and Indonesia. They typically find different growth rates of earnings among the poor and the nonpoor. Increasing mean individual and family earnings consistent with decreasing poverty coexist with increasing inequality and limited mobility. Interestingly, in Peru and Indonesia, Grim (2006) underscores the relevance of transfer policies as he observes significant mobility among originally poor households moving out of poverty and non-poor households moving into poverty despite low or negligible economic growth rates. In contrast, Gottschalk (1997) reports that despite an increase of 27 percent in per capita incomes, poverty in the US between 1973 and 1994 increased from 11.1 percent to 14.5 percent.
Our study complements previous work in both scale and scope. We examine 14 countries during the period 1992 to 2003, analyzing not only the mobility estimator, β , but also changes in the "poverty incidence" for the pseudo-individuals, analyzing the determinants of them. For that purpose, for each cohort we compute the percentage of individuals whose income is below a "poverty threshold" (poverty incidence within the cohort) and then, denoting that percentage by p, we estimate the determinants of the changes in poverty incidence in the cohorts:
In this way we are able to provide estimators of the role of initial conditions on income mobility and the transitions up and down poverty lines.
Data
The raw data for this study comes from national household surveys of 14 Latin American Although this design entailed a loss of information from available surveys in some countries, it allowed us to reach the best combination of number of countries (in this case, fourteen) with number of periods (in this case, six). 7 In other words, we dismiss the "excess" of information for some countries in favor of more countries and a lengthier pseudo-panel.
Nonetheless, this implies that our interpretation of the dynamics is no longer tied to the customary annual period but to a two-year period. All in all, we construct the pseudo-panel with data from 14 countries using surveys between 1992 and 2003, focusing on household heads aged 21 to 65.
A particularly rigorous approach was taken to the harmonization of household income in the surveys to ensure a comparable definition of household incomes across countries. Based on 9 each survey questionnaire, income from four main sources is considered: monetary labor income, non-monetary labor income, monetary non-labor income and non-monetary non-labor income (see Table 2 Cohorts are constructed based on year of birth, country of residence and gender. Our pseudopanel averages observations pertaining to the same survey weighting each observation by the corresponding expansion factors in each survey. As a result, the constructed pseudo-panel follows eight birth cohorts over six periods. This comprises a total of 139,132 individual 8 Reportedly, only MIDEPLAN does National Accounts adjustments in the CASEN survey in Chile. 9 In particular, four and six-year spans were attempted and the estimates of the time-dependence mobility did not change substantively. Tables 1 and 2 in Annex 2 report these estimates. Neither the magnitude of the parameters, nor the significance of the controls nor the R 2 of each specification change substantively.
observations collapsed into 1,024 synthetic observations that constitute a representative sample of household heads for the 14 countries under consideration. This number of observations is the result of collapsing the dataset by country (14 countries), gender (1 for men and 0 for women) and the eight birth cohorts (from 1927-33 to 1976-82) , for the six periods of analysis. That would imply a total of 14x2x8x6=1,344 synthetic observations. However, some countries had missing household surveys for some years (especially the earlier ones), and others were not usable due to the lack of a possibility to harmonize variables, as mentioned earlier. As a result the number of synthetic observations was reduced to 1,024. Table 1 .below reports the distribution of synthetic observations by period and across birth cohorts as well as the distribution of initial observations from the household surveys used in the analysis (that is, before collapsing the dataset by country gender and cohort). Finally, the last column in Table 1 also shows the distribution of original observations after being expanded using population factor weights in the household surveys. This pseudo-panel exceeds both the depth and breath of other pseudo-panels for the Latin American region. Also, it shows the implications of striking a balance between a relevant number of cohorts and a meaningful size of cohort. An insufficiently large number of cohorts may cause pseudo-panel estimations to suffer from small sample problems, while an insufficiently large cohort size diminishes the quality of estimates for population cohort 11 characteristics (McKenzie, 2004) . In the case of this pseudo-panel, the result of multiple periods, birth cohorts and cohort criteria is the small number of observations for some of the cells, which should be born in mind at the time of interpreting our estimates.
Another special consideration of this pseudo-panel design is in order as gender of the household head has been considered one of the variables to construct the pseudo-panels. The concern may arise in light of the sustained trend of increasing female participation in Latin The two measures of poverty incidence, also reported in Table   2 , deserve special mention. They capture the fraction of households (or, equivalently, household heads) within each cohort whose per-capita household income falls below the two most common internationally utilized thresholds of 1 and 2 dollars a day. 13 Interestingly, the variable measuring dwelling characteristics captures the quality of the living conditions of the households. The variable is computed using information about the quality of the materials used for the walls, the number of rooms, whether the household has a bathroom connected to a sewerage system inside the house or not, and access to a source of safe water and electricity. This variable, which we refer to as the Dwelling Characteristics Index, is constructed as the first principal component that explains most of the variance of the characteristics mentioned above. By construction, it has a zero-mean and a symmetric distribution around it. Table 2 1934-1940 1948-1954 1969-1975 Per 1934-1940 1948-1954 1969-1975 Per 1934-1940 1948-1954 1969-1975 Per 1934-1940 1948-1954 1969-1975 Source: Authors' calculations based on IDB Research Department Harmonized Household Surveys.
Interestingly, these trends differ from nominal per capita household incomes and even PPP-adjusted national per capita GDP. For all the sub-regions and the Region as a whole, per capita income and GDP increased in the 1990s, as reported by CEPAL (2007), and were accompanied by a substantive decrease in poverty during the same period from 48 percent in 1990 to 39 percent in 2005. There are at least two reasons why these trends may differ. First, the latter trends refer to the average per capita income and inform little on the income trends of poor households. What we know about such changes (as reported below in Table 3 ) is that sizeable and symmetric movements take place into and out of poverty in the Region for the period considered. As a result, even if the incidence of poverty is to change, large overall change should not be expected, as there are substantive composition effects from both households leaving and 15 entering poverty. This evidence in Latin America confirms evidence reported in the United
States pointing to diverging trends in GDP growth, mean earnings and poverty incidence (see Gottschalk, 1997) . Second, while Figure 1 reports PPP-adjusted real trends, GDP trends refer to the nominal purchasing power of each national currency in its respective country. That is, Figure   1 reports the real purchasing power of local currencies in the international economy or, more specifically, how the purchasing power of a Chilean peso or a Venezuelan Bolivar, for instance, would fare in the US over time. That purchasing power has typically declined over time, partly due to the increasing inflationary trend in the US in the same period. Of course, this deterioration of international purchasing power of a household in a given country should not necessarily bear comparable effects in terms of its domestic purchasing power and, ultimately, poverty status.
Estimations of Income Mobility and the Determinants of Poverty Changes
In this section we provide estimates of income mobility (Equation 3 in Section 2) and the determinants of changes on poverty incidence within the cohorts (Equation 4 in Section 2). The observational unit is the household, with additional variables capturing the personal characteristics of the household head. The dependent variable used in our estimates is the log of per capita household incomes for the period under consideration, which Fields and Ok (1999) demonstrate to be the only measure of income movement to have a set of desired properties (scale invariance, symmetry, multiplicability and additive separability). As outlined in the data section, our variable results from the sum of labor and non-labor incomes of all household members divided by the total household size as reported by the household survey selected in each two-year period. Table 3 respectively. To the extent that these models are controlling for intra-regional variability but not for individuals' characteristics, we consider these estimators as "unconditional" according to the terminology introduced in Section 2. The results confirm a very low degree of income mobility for Latin America, as previously found in the literature. The estimate of the unconditional mobility indicator, β , is as high as 0.966 (when no control is considered). Absolute value of t statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Source: Authors' calculations based on IDB Research Department Harmonized Household Surveys.
The estimated mobility changes substantially after controls are introduced. Taking Model III as a point of departure and gradually adding controls for characteristics of the household head (age, gender and educational attainment), number of children 16 years old or less living at home and the dwelling characteristics index described above, the estimated mobility falls to almost two-thirds of its unconditional value. 13 This evidence suggests that a misleading attribution of demographic and socioeconomic impacts to past incomes may well generate a false sense of limited time-dependence income mobility.
12 To estimate time dependence income mobility, the regression model uses the lagged of real per capita household income. For that reason the number of total observations is reduced to 800. 13 Note that adding the dwelling characteristics index reduces the number of observations from 800 to 500. To discard the possibility of sample composition effects driving the results, we also estimated Models IV and V using only the 500 observations included in Model VI. The results are almost identical. A country-specific analysis of mobility should reveal the existing heterogeneity across the Region. Table 5 reports country-specific estimates of mobility for Models I, IV, V and VI. As in the aggregate, the sole introduction of household head characteristics notably reduces the measured mobility. The most notorious cases are Panama and Uruguay where the estimators of mobility were reduced to less than one-third of their unconditional values. The further introduction of controls for children (16 years old or less) at home and dwelling characteristics further reduced the estimated conditional mobility, but to a lesser extent, in most countries (Brazil, Colombia and Costa Rica being interesting exceptions).
The estimates of income mobility in Table 5 are consistent with the finding of restrained mobility in Chile reported by Contreras et al. (2004) .
Even though this limited evidence does not allow for generalizations, it may be that Regionpooled estimates average out different country-specific patterns of income mobility. Then, we develop an indicator that captures changes in poverty incidence within the cohorts over time, that is, mobility around a threshold that can be thought as a poverty line. We perform the exercise for the widely used international poverty cut-offs of US$1/day and US$2/day per person. 14 While some critiques view this methodology as either consistently underestimating the number of the poor (Reddy and Pogge, 2003) or grossly overestimating them 14 World Bank (1990) Notwithstanding the relevance of such criticisms, they are not the focus of the paper. We follow the vast tradition of considering the US$2/day per person international poverty line as an appropriate threshold for international comparisons across the typically middle-income economies in Latin America (and further compare them with estimates accruing from a US$1/day line). For the construction of such indicator we first compute the poverty incidence within each cohort or synthetic observation (that is, the percentage of households that have an average per capita income below the poverty cut-offs). Then, we subtract the poverty incidence of each synthetic observation in one period with the one observed in the previous period. With this procedure we obtain a measure of the changes in poverty incidence for each cohort. Having constructed the indicator of changes in poverty incidence for the pseudo-observations we then estimate the determinants of those changes using equation (4) in Section 2. Being the case that the dependent variable, by construction, is bounded between -1 and 1, the estimation is performed using a two-limit Tobit model with these two extremes as lower and upper limits respectively. The aggregate results are reported in Table 6 . Observations 500 500 500 500 500 500
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Source: Authors' calculations based on IDB Research Department Harmonized Household Surveys.
The most salient regularities on the estimations of the determinants of changes in poverty incidence are the role of age and gender of the household head, and the poverty incidence in the previous period for each pseudo-observation. 16 Results indicate that higher levels of initial poverty reduce the probability of poverty changes, in any direction, which is reminiscent of the notion of poverty traps (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2003) and lack of poverty convergence (Ravallion 2009 ) at a country level: poorer countries have a "dynamic poverty disadvantage" (Ravallion 2009: 29) regardless of human development levels as they do not grow faster than non poor countries and their growth is not pro-poor. Similarly, at a household level, poor households should expect higher poverty immobility than non-poor households. This is also true for extremely poor households. When estimating a quadratic impact of age, we found it to be statistically significant, with the relationship depicting a U-shape. The age of the household head at which the changes in poverty of her/his household are minimal is around the late 40s. As age increases, poverty mobility decreases up to the late forty's age peak; thereafter, age is associated with higher probability of poverty mobility (which, could be either into or out of poverty).
Regarding gender, estimates suggest that the gender of the head of household is not a statistically significant determinant on the chances of either moving out of poverty or falling into it, although the effect varies when countries are being controlled for. In contrast, we find evidence of a positive impact of dwelling characteristics on changes in poverty incidence when controlling for countries.
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In theory, the role of number of children at home (or household size) in poverty mobility is unclear. A larger household size implies larger needs to cater for within the household, on the one hand, but also, typically, additional caretakers and higher incentives for adult members to work (as discussed in Cuesta, 2006) . Which thrust dominates remains an empirical question. For the sample and period analyzed, our estimates show that the aggregated effect of number of children living in a household is to increase the probability of poverty changes (again, either in or out of poverty).
The role of education of the household head deserves particular discussion. We found positive, statistically significant and economically relevant impacts of education on the changes in poverty incidence, especially among those with primary education (either complete or incomplete), for the specifications that did not make country distinctions (that is, for Models 1 and 2). 18 This implies that primary education (either complete or incomplete) increases the probability of poverty changes. This result does not specify, however, the composition of poverty mobility, that is, whether moves out of poverty dominate over moves into poverty, or viceversa.
Interestingly, when introducing the set of country dummies results are reversed. Now, educational attainments from primary, secondary and tertiary education have all significant impacts on poverty mobility: in fact, they all have a negative impact, which suggests that education reduces poverty changes. In other words, households with higher educational accomplishments are less vulnerable to poverty mobility (in or out of poverty). A second key result is that the role of education on the chances of moving in and out of poverty seems to differ by country. An analysis of the same estimations at the country level promises to deliver interesting insights about it. Table 7 presents estimates of the determinants of poverty mobility at country level for the US$2/day poverty cut-off.
Reassuringly, country results confirm by and large the main conclusions on the impacts from initial poverty level, age, gender, household size and dwelling characteristics reported for the region as a whole in Table 6 . Interestingly, education keeps playing a statistical significant role on poverty mobility by country. Tertiary education reduces the probability of poverty mobility at a statistically significant level and consistently across countries except for Chile, which increases that probability. In countries like Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica and Mexico, primary and secondary education also affects the probability of poverty mobility although in different directions. In Chile, again, educational attainment increases poverty mobility, while for the rest, educational attainment decreases poverty mobility. 18 The base category is No Education. Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Source: Authors' calculations based on IDB Research Department Harmonized Household Surveys.
Results thus far do not single out compositional effects when explaining poverty changes, that is, whether, for instance, higher educational attainments are associated with a higher probability of moving out of poverty vis-à-vis a lower probability falling into poverty. In order to better understand the role of education in the dynamics of poverty, Table 8 reports the estimated impacts of education on poverty mobility disaggregated by educational level; whether or not the level was complete; and changes out of and into poverty separately. Each transition category already controls for the initial poverty position of each pseudo-observation, so the initial poverty variable is no longer included in the regression. Results from a multinomial logit (using "always poor" as baseline category) show that after controlling for country specific effects, socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, the effects of each level of education (and whether or not level was completed) have distinct and asymmetric effects on poverty mobility.
In effect, primary education attainment reduces the probability of moving out of poverty, while secondary and tertiary increases the probability of moving out of poverty. This effect is increasingly stronger as educational attainment increases: completing tertiary education doubles the effect of incomplete tertiary education on moving out of poverty, which in turn is stronger than complete secondary education. Instead, the impact of educational attainment is mostly statistical insignificant when explaining moving into poverty (all other factors controlled for) -a surprising exception being complete secondary education that increases the probability of falling into poverty. Results, therefore, suggest that there are substantive compositional effects in the relationship between education and mobility, which vary by level of education and type of (in and out) poverty transitions. Although the aim of the paper is not to explore country-specific explanations underlying mobility estimates, Table 9 reports some basic descriptive statistics on economic growth, labour and social spending. It also includes educational attainment and inequality of opportunities specific to education, which have been singled out as main factor explaining income mobility Leite (2009) . On the one hand, high rates of returns to schooling and/or an expansionary educational policy will increase attainment and reduce income immobility. On the other, the extent to that impact depends on how much inequality of opportunity (that is, current inequalities explained by 'circumstances' at birth) prevents an individual from grasping those inequality-reducing, mobility-enhancing prospects and how close educational attainment is to an upper-bound (see Behrman et al 2001 a lucid explanation). Table 9 expectedly shows stark differences across countries in terms of economic growth, unemployment, informality, labour income growth and gender-based wage dispersion and rule of law all likely to affect, directly or indirectly, the generation of household incomes. These differences, although difficult to generalize, point towards a better performance among those countries with persistently high immobility after controls are introduced ("conditional immob." row: Brazil, Colombia and Costa Rica): they show typically better averages -although a mixed balance of dispersion-in all those indicators than the rest of countries. Note, however, that the 27 magnitudes of such differences are not substantive between the two groups, which would suggest that differences in their mobility would not lie on their economic performance during the decade.
Interestingly, educational trends purport the opposite message. Both public spending on education alone and in addition to health remain lower for the persistently immobile group of countries than for the rest in the region throughout the period considered. Both primary and secondary enrolment rates reach substantively lower levels than the group of more conditionalmobile countries. Equality of opportunities in education (that is, the proportion of educational See columns "opportunity of education index" in Table 8 as reported by Paes et al (2009). 19 Also, these countries in conjunction with Chile are those with the largest returns to tertiary education, close or exceeding 20%, well above primary returns, which may explain the reported differences in the poverty mobility results of these countries vis-à-vis the rest of the region.
Systematic and comprehensive series of rates of return to schooling are hard to come across for the period under consideration. Duryea et al (2003) constitutes an exception, reporting rates of return for secondary and tertiary education for a similar sample of countries and period to this article (see Figure 2) . Interestingly, the notion than higher returns are associated with higher mobility does not necessarily hold: Brazil, Colombia and Costa Rica, the most conditional-immobile countries in the region are among the countries with largest returns both on secondary and tertiary education. However, they are the only countries in which temporal trends for rates of return for secondary and tertiary education just move in opposite directions: that is, when, for example, secondary education returns increase over time from the onset to the middle of the decade, tertiary returns decrease in that same period. That would suggest a cancellation effect crippling the ability of rates of returns to affect income mobility in those three countriesat least to population group of urban males ages 30-50. 19 The picture is inconclusive as far as dispersion trends are concerned. A coefficient of variations higher than the regional average is observed at times for the conditional-immobile group, while the opposite is also observed. Kaufmann et al (2008) , and Paes et al (2009) Notes: Informality is defined as the percentage of workers without health and old-age insurance; The "rule of law" indicator measures "perceptions of the extent to which the agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of the society", relating to contract enforcement, property rights, the police, courts, and the likelihood of crime and violence. The index takes values from -2.5 to 2.5 (in which a higher score represents a better outcome). Duryea et al (2003) In broad terms, those results are consistent with estimates of high immobility in Latin America (vis-à-vis the US) and large discrepancies by country, with Brazil and Colombia typically reported among the highly immobile (although previous evidence has admittedly analyzed a shorter sample of countries than in this paper). Also, highly immobility is consistent with lower equality of opportunities in the sample analyzed, especially in Brazil. Nonetheless, providing more clear-cut explanations would necessarily require a more detailed look not only at outcomes but also at the policies affecting income inequality, inequality of opportunities, human capital formation and its returns. That implies an in-depth analysis of taxation regimes and reforms; specific composition of health and education overall public spending; existence and coverage of programs facilitating female participation in labor markets and future child development (such as, for example, pre-school provision, subsidized early childhood development programs); trade policies affecting relative wages; among others. They fall outside the scope of this paper but constitute an important area of mobility-related research on its own.
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Conclusions
Difficulties in the construction of panel-data have prevented a comprehensive analysis of mobility in Latin America and elsewhere in the developing world. This paper sheds some light on the implications of mobility in the Region by constructing, alternatively, a pseudo-panel for 30 14 countries over 11 years and eight birth cohorts. Our analysis focuses on the standard notion of income mobility and, in addition, explores a notion of "poverty mobility" around thresholds or poverty lines. We show that the Region as a whole is highly immobile both in income and poverty terms. However, a sizeable part of this immobility results from failing to account from the effects that personal and socioeconomic controls have on mobility (over 30 percent of the unconditional time-dependence mobility). Country-specific differences are also substantive and tend to cancel out when grouped into traditional sub-regions (Andes, Southern Cone, Central America). Current levels of incomes and poverty not explained by past levels of incomes or past poverty status may vary widely across countries, in some cases exceeding well over 50 percent of estimated changes. Specific to poverty mobility, we found statistically significant roles for age, gender and, education of the household head , the latter suggesting distinctive effects from different levels of education, completion status and the nature of the poverty transition (statistically significant and positive for moving out of poverty; statistically insignificant for falling into poverty).
Notwithstanding the limitations of the modeling, we reject as simplistic and misleading the widely accepted notion of a dominating socioeconomic immobility throughout the Region. This is a first step towards uncovering the underlying dynamics of poverty mobility. Further modeling efforts and the construction of appropriate panel data will be critical in providing further steps. Also, it should contribute to clarify results difficult to explain thus far relating the role of certain levels of education in specific countries. Once a year September Urban -28 cities (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) 
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